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This	  paper	  has	  two	  goals.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  carefully	  reasoned	  argument	  for	  ethical	  veganism:	  
the	  view	  that	  it	  is	  (at	  least	  typically)	  wrong	  to	  eat	  or	  otherwise	  use	  animal	  products.	  The	  second	  
goal	   is	   to	  give	  you,	   the	  reader,	  some	  important	  tools	   for	  developing,	  evaluating,	  and	  replying	  to	  
reasoned	  arguments	  for	  ethical	  conclusions.	  I	  begin	  by	  offering	  you	  a	  brief	  essay,	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  
wrong	   to	   eat	  meat.	   This	   essay	   both	   introduces	   central	   elements	   of	  my	   case	   for	   veganism,	   and	  
serves	  as	  one	  helpful	  model	  of	  a	  short	  ethics	  essay.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  use	  the	  model	  
essay	  as	  a	  target,	  to	  illustrate	  important	  strategies	  for	  developing	  objections	  to	  ethical	  arguments.	  
I	  will	  also	  illustrate	  a	  range	  of	  important	  ways	  for	  the	  vegan	  to	  reply	  to	  these	  objections.	  You	  can	  
use	  the	  models	  and	  skills	  I	  illustrate	  here	  in	  your	  own	  essays,	  and	  in	  your	  reasoned	  evaluation	  of	  
ethical	   arguments.	   I	   conclude	   that	   the	   arguments	   and	   replies	   offered	   in	   this	   paper	   add	  up	   to	   a	  
powerful	   reasoned	   case	   for	   ethical	   veganism.	   You	   can	   practice	   the	   skills	   I	   illustrate	   here	   to	  
deciding	  for	  yourself	  –	  in	  a	  reasoned	  way	  –	  whether	  my	  conclusion	  is	  correct.	  	  	  
I	  begin	  with	  the	  promised	  model	  essay:	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  Wrong	  to	  Eat	  Meat	  
Most	  of	  us	  think	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  adopt	  a	  puppy	  from	  a	  shelter,	  in	  order	  to	  
take	  it	  home	  and	  torture	  it	  until	  it	  dies.	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  think	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  a	  
steak	   for	   dinner.	   In	   this	   essay,	   I	  will	   argue	   that	   these	   views	   are	   hard	   to	   square	  with	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each	  other,	  and	  that	  the	  second	  view	  is	  false:	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  My	  argument	  has	  
the	  following	  structure:	  	  
1. It	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer	  
2. If	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer,	  then	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals	  
3. If	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals,	  then	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat	  
C. It	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  	  
This	   argument	   is	   valid.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   conclusion	   must	   be	   true	   if	   all	   of	   the	  
premises	  are	  true.	  I	  will	  defend	  each	  of	  these	  premises	  in	  turn.	  
	  	   First,	  why	  think	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer?	  To	  begin,	  think	  about	  
why	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  another	  person	  suffer.	  Part	  of	  the	  most	  plausible	  explanation	  
is	  that	  because	  suffering	  is	  awful	  to	  experience,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  suffering.	  Because	  
an	  animal’s	  suffering	  is	  awful	  for	  it,	  this	  explanation	  entails	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  an	  
animal	  suffer.	  	  
	   This	  premise	  of	  my	  argument	  assumes	  that	  animals	  can	  suffer,	  which	  is	  mildly	  
controversial.	   For	   example,	   René	   Descartes	   suggested	   that	   animals	   are	   just	  
complicated	  machines	  with	  no	  inner	  lives	  (1991	  [1640],	  148).	  However,	  Descartes’	  views	  
are	  scientifically	  indefensible	  (see	  Allen	  and	  Trestman	  2014,	  §7.1),	  so	  I	  set	  them	  aside.	  	  
You	  might	  object	  to	  my	  case	  for	  my	  first	  premise	  that	  it	  is	  only	  wrong	  to	  make	  
a	   creature	   suffer	   if	   that	   creature	   is	   an	   ethical	   agent:	   the	   sort	   of	   being	   who	   can	   be	  
morally	  responsible	  for	  its	  actions.	  But	  this	  is	  false.	  It	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  babies	  suffer,	  
and	  they	  are	  not	  ethical	  agents.	  You	  might	  object	  that	  it	  is	  only	  wrong	  to	  make	  human	  
beings	   suffer.	   This	   is	   implausible	   for	   several	   reasons.	   First,	   think	   about	   torturing	   a	  
baby:	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  this	  is	  surely	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  suffering	  inflicted,	  not	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  baby	  has	  a	  human	  genetic	  code.	  Second,	  imagine	  a	  non-­‐human	  animal	  with	  a	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miraculous	  mutation,	  which	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  speak,	  reason,	  and	  feel	  as	  much	  as	  you	  
or	   I	  do.	   Surely	   the	  mere	   fact	   that	   such	  an	  animal	   is	  not	  genetically	  human	  does	  not	  
make	  it	  okay	  to	  torture	  it	  (compare	  Peter	  Singer’s	  argument	  against	  such	  ‘speciesism’	  
in	  his	  1977).	  And,	  finally,	  think	  again	  about	  the	  case	  I	  began	  this	  essay	  with:	  it	  is	  wrong	  
to	  torture	  a	  puppy.	  But	  surely	  the	  central	  explanation	  here	  is	   just	  the	  same	  as	  with	  a	  
human	  victim:	   torture	  will	   inflict	  horrible	  suffering	  on	  the	  puppy,	  and	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  
inflict	  such	  suffering.	  	  	  	  
Some	  authors,	  like	  Carl	  Cohen	  (1986,	  867)	  insist	  that	  all	  suffering	  is	  not	  equal:	  
human	   suffering	   is	   much	   more	   ethically	   important	   than	   animal	   suffering.	   My	  
argument	  is	  compatible	  with	  this	  thesis.	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  that	  torturing	  a	  puppy	  is	  just	  
as	  bad	  as	  torturing	  a	  human	  being.	  I	  think	  the	  latter	  is	  typically	  much	  worse.	  My	  claim	  
is	  only	   that	  making	   the	  puppy	  suffer	   is	  wrong,	  and	   that	   the	  pleasure	  a	  human	  being	  
might	  take	  from	  torturing	  it	  does	  not	  justify	  inflicting	  that	  suffering.	  	  	  	  
	   Next,	  I	  argue	  that	  if	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  them.	  
Some	  people	  find	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals	  much	  less	  intuitive	  than	  the	  
idea	   that	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   make	   them	   suffer.	   However,	   an	   example	   shows	   that	   this	  
combination	  of	  views	  –	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer,	  but	  not	  to	  kill	  them	  –	  
is	  difficult	  to	  defend.	  Suppose	  that	  there	  is	  a	  cow	  that	  has	  a	  disease	  that	  will	  be	  fatal	  
unless	  treated	  by	  giving	  the	  cow	  a	  painful	  medical	  operation.	  If	  the	  cow	  would	  go	  on	  to	  
have	   a	   long	   and	   pleasant	   life	   after	   the	   operation,	   performing	   this	   operation	   seems	  
good,	  not	  wrong.	  This	  shows	  that	  an	  ordinarily	  wrongful	  act	  –	  inflicting	  suffering	  on	  a	  
cow	   –	   can	   be	   permissible	   if	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   save	   the	   cow’s	   life.	   But	   if	   saving	   an	  
animal’s	  life	  can	  justify	  inflicting	  suffering	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  wrong,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  
understand	  how	  taking	  that	  animal’s	  life	  could	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  ethical	  indifference.	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We	   can	   bolster	   this	   initial	   argument	   by	   combining	   it	   with	   a	   plausible	  
explanation	   of	   why	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   kill	   animals.	  One	   important	   reason	  why	   killing	   a	  
person	   is	   typically	  wrong	  is	  that	  killing	  typically	  deprives	  the	  victim	  of	  an	  objectively	  
valuable	   future.	   That	   is,	   killing	   someone	   deprives	   them	   of	   the	   valuable	   experiences	  
activities,	   projects,	   etc.	   that	   they	  would	  otherwise	  have	  had	   (compare	  Marquis	   1989,	  
§II;	   I	  do	  not	  claim,	  with	  Marquis,	  that	  this	   is	  the	   ‘primary’	  thing	  wrong	  with	  killing).	  
This	  principle	  applies	  to	  animals	  as	  well:	  just	  as	  suffering	  can	  make	  an	  animal’s	  life	  go	  
badly,	  pleasant	  experiences	  can	  make	  it	  go	  well.	  So,	  just	  as	  with	  humans,	  it	  is	  plausible	  
that	  it	  is	  (typically)	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals	  because	  doing	  so	  deprives	  them	  of	  a	  valuable	  
future.	  	  	   	  	  
Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  if	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  Killing	  
and	  eating	  are,	  obviously,	  not	  the	  same	  thing:	  in	  our	  economically	  specialized	  society,	  
many	   meat-­‐eaters	   never	   even	   see	   the	   animals	   they	   eat	   alive,	   let	   alone	   make	   them	  
suffer	  or	  kill	  them.	  However,	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  eating	  meat	  is	  okay.	  To	  see	  why,	  
consider	  an	  analogy.	  	  
There	   is	  a	  new	  restaurant	   in	   town:	   the	   food	   is	   sensational,	  and	  the	  prices	  are	  
very	   low.	  How	  do	   they	  do	   it?	  Here’s	   how:	   the	   owner	   kidnaps	  world-­‐class	   chefs,	   and	  
enslaves	  them	  at	  the	  restaurant.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  owner	   is	  connected	  with	  the	  mob,	  
and	  going	  to	  the	  police	  would	  just	  get	  you	  killed.	  Your	  patronizing	  the	  restaurant	  does	  
not	   enslave	   anyone,	   but	   it	   still	   seems	  wrong.	  The	   explanation	   for	  why	   it	   is	  wrong	   is	  
roughly	  that	  by	  patronizing	  the	  restaurant,	  you	  would	  be	  complicit	  in	  wrongdoing:	  you	  
would	   be	   benefiting	   from	   a	   wrongful	   act	   (enslavement),	   while	   economically	  
supporting	  the	  wrongdoer	  (the	  slaver).	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Making	  animals	  suffer	  may	  be	  less	  awful	  than	  enslaving	  another	  human	  being.	  
But	   the	   same	   form	  of	   explanation	   applies	   to	   eating	  meat.	  The	   raising	  of	   animals	   for	  
food	   causes	   those	   animals	   a	   horrifying	   amount	   of	   suffering,	   and	   early	   death	   (see	  
Mason	   and	   Singer	   1990	   for	   some	   of	   the	   literally	   grisly	   details).	   If	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   kill	  
animals	   and	   to	   cause	   them	   to	   suffer,	   then	   the	   industry	   that	   produces	   our	  meat	   acts	  
wrongly	   on	   a	   massive	   scale.	   It	   is	   wrong	   to	   eat	   meat	   because	   in	   doing	   so	   you	   are	  
complicit	  with	  that	  massive	  and	  systematic	  wrongdoing.	  
In	  this	  essay	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  One	  clarification	  of	  this	  
conclusion	   is	   in	   order:	   like	  many	   ethical	   claims,	   it	   should	   be	   read	   as	   a	   claim	   about	  
what	   is	   typically	   true.	   It	   is	   typically	  wrong	   for	   you	   to	   break	   all	   of	  my	   fingers,	   but	   if	  
doing	  so	   is	   the	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  nuclear	  catastrophe,	  break	  away!	  Similarly,	   there	  
may	  be	  unusual	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  is	  permissible	  or	  even	  required	  to	  eat	  meat.	  
Nonetheless,	  if	  my	  argument	  is	  sound,	  each	  of	  us	  does	  wrong	  almost	  every	  time	  we	  sit	  
down	  to	  a	  meal	  that	  contains	  meat.	  	  	  
	  
I	  have	  written	  “It	  is	  Wrong	  to	  Eat	  Meat”	  as	  a	  model	  short	  philosophy	  essay.	  Unless	  your	  professor	  
tells	  you	  otherwise,	  you	  would	  do	  well	  to	  emulate	  several	  of	  the	  stylistic	  features	  of	  this	  essay:	  
• The	  introduction	  offers	  a	  brief	  clear	  motive	  for	  the	  question	  addressed,	  states	  the	  essay’s	  
thesis,	  and	  previews	  the	  argument	  to	  come;	  
• 	  The	  argument	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  summarized	  in	  valid	  premise/conclusion	  form;	  	  
• The	   essay	   does	   not	   waste	   words:	   every	   sentence	   is	   dedicated	   to	   developing	   the	   central	  
argument,	  explaining	  a	  concept,	  introducing	  an	  objection	  or	  replying	  to	  it,	  or	  doing	  other	  
important	   work.	   Even	   the	   conclusion	   does	   important	   work,	   introducing	   a	   crucial	  
clarification	  of	  the	  argument.	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• The	  essay	  does	  not	  use	  lengthy	  quotes	  from	  its	  sources:	  instead,	  it	  cites	  those	  sources	  after	  
stating	  (in	  my	  own	  words)	  key	  claims	  that	  I	  take	  from	  them.	  	  
The	  argument	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  also	  an	  excellent	  target	  for	  reasoned	  objections.	  I	  now	  discuss	  how	  
to	  offer	  such	  objections.	  
	   First,	   let’s	   back	   up	   a	   bit	   and	   think	   about	   the	   activity	   that	   we	   are	   engaged	   in.	   We	   are	  
seeking	  to	  make	  and	  to	  evaluate	  reasoned	  arguments	  about	  ethics.	  For	  example,	  the	  model	  essay	  
did	  not	  just	  disagree	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  okay	  to	  eat	  meat;	  it	  offered	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  
claim	   is	   incorrect,	   and	   it	   organized	   those	   reasons	   into	   an	   argument.	  Making	   an	   argument	  does	  
not	   simply	   aim	   to	  persuade	   your	   reader.	   I	   know,	   for	   example,	   that	  no	   reasoned	   argument	   is	   as	  
likely	   to	   change	   eating	   habits	   as	   grisly	   video	   footage	   of	   life	   inside	   the	   animal	   factories	   that	  
produce	  our	  meat.	  If	  philosophers	  aimed	  simply	  to	  persuade,	  we	  would	  write	  clever	  advertising,	  
rather	  than	  carefully	  argued	  essays.	  Instead,	  my	  aim	  as	  a	  philosopher	  is	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  together	  
with	  my	   audience,	   in	   a	   way	   that	   respects	   the	   ability	   of	   each	   person	   involved	   to	   find	   the	   truth	  
herself,	  using	  her	  own	  ability	  to	  reason.	  My	  aim	  now	  is	  to	  offer	  you	  some	  tools	  to	  enable	  you	  to	  
skillfully	  engage	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  respectful	  argumentation.	  	  
	   For	  many	  of	  you,	   the	  conclusion	  of	   the	  model	  essay	   is	  a	  challenge	  to	  your	  ethical	  views.	  
You	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  reply	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  challenge	  by	  simply	  disagreeing	  with	  the	  conclusion.	  
Resist	   this	   temptation:	   if	   an	   author	   offers	   you	   an	   argument,	   and	   you	   ignore	   the	   argument	   and	  
simply	  reject	  their	  conclusion,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  seek	  the	  truth	  together	  with	  you.	  So,	  when	  you	  
are	   presented	  with	   an	   argument,	   your	   central	   question	   should	   be:	   does	   this	   argument	   give	  me	  
good	   reason	   to	   accept	   its	   conclusion?	  The	  model	   argument	  appears	   to	  be	  valid:	   the	   truth	  of	   its	  
premises	  would	  logically	  ensure	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  conclusion.	  When	  you	  object	  to	  a	  valid	  argument,	  
you	  should	  focus	  on	  objecting	  to	  its	  premises,	  not	  the	  conclusion.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  argument	  
purports	  to	  offer	  you	  reasons	  to	  accept	  its	  conclusion,	  and	  if	  you	  cannot	  explain	  why	  you	  should	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reject	  those	  reasons,	  you	  aren’t	  providing	  a	  compelling	  reply	  to	  the	  argument.1	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
if	  you	  can	  identify	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  reject	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  an	  argument,	  you	  have	  made	  an	  
important	   and	   constructive	   contribution,	   by	   explaining	  why	   a	   reasonable	  person	   should	  not	  be	  
persuaded	  by	  the	  argument.	  This	  is	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  offer	  reasoned	  objections	  
to	  the	  premises	  of	  an	  argument.	  	  
Developing	  reasoned	  objections	  is	  in	  part	  a	  creative	  task,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  recipe	  for	  doing	  
it	  well.	  However,	  there	  are	  several	  useful	  general	  strategies	  for	  finding	  good	  objections.	  Taking	  the	  
model	   essay	   as	   a	   target,	   I	   will	   introduce	   some	   of	   these	   strategies,	   and	   illustrate	   them	   with	  
exemplary	  objections	   to	   the	  model	   essay.	  Another	   important	  philosophical	   skill	   is	   to	   assess	   the	  
import	   of	   potential	   objections.	   Because	   of	   this,	   when	   I	   consider	   each	   objection	   I	   will	   discuss	  
whether	   the	   objections	   can	   be	   answered,	   whether	   it	   calls	   for	   some	   amendment	   to	   the	   model	  
essay’s	  argument,	  or	  whether	  it	  constitutes	  a	  promising	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  the	  overall	  strategy	  of	  
the	  model	  argument.	  The	  point	  of	  carefully	  exploring	  objections	  and	  replies	  is	  to	  arrive	  ultimately	  
at	  the	  best	  arguments	  that	  can	  be	  made	  on	  each	  side	  of	  an	  ethical	  issue,	  like	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  
it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  Because	  objections	  should	  target	  the	  premises	  of	  an	  argument	  (as	  I	  have	  
emphasized),	  I	  will	  organize	  my	  discussion	  by	  focusing	  on	  each	  premise	  in	  turn.	  	  	  	  
	  
Premise	  One:	  inflicting	  suffering	  	  
Premise	  One	  of	  the	  model	  argument	  says:	  	  	  	  
1. It	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  paragraph	  simplifies	  in	  several	  ways.	  First,	  in	  some	  arguments	  the	  premises	  (even	  if	  true)	  simply	  fail	  to	  support	  
the	   conclusion,	   even	   given	   a	   charitable	   interpretation.	   Clearly	   demonstrating	   that	   fact	   can	   be	   a	   powerful	   way	   of	  
objecting	   to	  such	  an	  argument.	  Second,	   some	  philosophers	  have	  argued	   that	   it	  can	  be	   legitimate	   to	  object	   to	  certain	  
arguments	   as	   a	   whole,	   without	   criticizing	   either	   specific	   premises	   or	   the	   logical	   structure	   of	   the	   argument.	   For	  
discussion	  relevant	  to	  our	  topic,	  see	  McPherson	  2014	  and	  forthcoming-­‐a.	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In	  this	  section,	  I	  consider	  objections	  to	  this	  principle	  that	  are	  instances	  of	  three	  general	  strategies	  
for	   identifying	   objections:	   looking	   to	   extreme	   cases,	   appealing	   to	   an	   obscured	   distinction,	   and	  
appealing	  to	  a	  competing	  ethical	  principle.	  	  
One	   excellent	   way	   to	   find	   objections	   to	   ethical	   principles	   is	   to	   look	   to	   extreme	   cases	  
(Hájek	   forthcoming-­‐b,	   §4;	   this	   and	   Hájek	   forthcoming-­‐a	   are	   excellent	   sources	   of	   heuristics	   for	  
doing	  philosophy,	   although	   they	   are	  most	   suited	   for	   somewhat	   advanced	  philosophy	   students).	  
There	  are	  several	   relevant	   types	  of	  extreme	  cases.	  One	  type	  of	  extreme	  case	   involves	   raising	   the	  
stakes.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  some	  generic	  supervillain	  will	   incinerate	  the	  earth	  unless	  you	  
torture	  this	  puppy.	  It	  is	  surely	  required	  (and	  not	  wrong)	  to	  torture	  the	  puppy	  in	  that	  case.	  So	  it	  is	  
not	  always	  wrong	  to	  cause	  animals	  to	  suffer.	  	  
It	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   find	   an	   objection:	   you	   should	   also	   think	   about	   how	   someone	  
sympathetic	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  you	  are	  objecting	  to	  should	  reply	  to	  your	  objection.	  In	  this	  case,	  
there	  is	  a	  decisive	  reply	  to	  this	  objection:	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  model	  essay	  already	  granted	  that	  it	  
is	   only	   typically	   wrong	   to	   eat	   meat.	   Because	   scenarios	   involving	   comic-­‐book	   supervillains	   are	  
extremely	  atypical,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  effective	  objection	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  model	  essay.	  There	  is	  
an	   important	   lesson	   here:	   make	   sure	   that	   you	   interpret	   the	   argument	   you	   are	   objecting	   to	  
accurately	  and	  fairly.	  Failure	  to	  do	  this	  is	  so	  common	  it	  has	  its	  own	  name:	  the	  straw	  man	  fallacy.	  	  	  
A	  different	  sort	  of	  extreme	  case	  is	  more	  potent.	  If	  we	  arranged	  animals	  on	  a	  continuum	  of	  
cognitive	  sophistication,	  we	  would	  notice	   that	  puppies	  (which	   featured	   in	  the	  model	  argument)	  
are	  relatively	  close	  to	  us	  on	  that	  continuum.	  So:	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  model	  argument	  as	  we	  move	  
to	   animals	   farther	   away	   from	   us	   on	   that	   continuum?	  Here	   is	   one	   salient	   example:	   oysters	   and	  
other	  bivalves	  lack	  brains,	  and	  so	  are	  almost	  certainly	  incapable	  of	  suffering.	  Because	  one	  cannot	  
make	  an	  oyster	  suffer,	  it	  cannot	  be	  wrong	  to	  eat	  an	  oyster	  for	  the	  reasons	  suggested	  in	  the	  model	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essay.2	  Because	  there	  is	  nothing	  atypical	  about	  eating	  oysters,	  this	  case	  is	  an	  important	  objection	  
to	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  model	  essay.	  	  
One	   important	  way	  to	  reply	  to	  an	  objection	   is	   to	  concede	  that	   it	   requires	  one	  to	  modify	  
one’s	   argument.	   This	   objection	   to	   the	  model	   argument	   is	   powerful,	   and	   the	   best	   reply	   is	   thus	  
concessive.	  I	  grant	  that	  the	  model	  argument	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  oysters,	  and	  
so	   I	   conclude	   that	   the	   conclusion	  of	   the	  model	   argument	   should	  be	   restricted	   to	   apply	   only	   to	  
eating	  animals	  that	  can	  suffer.	  	  
This	   in	   turn	   raises	  a	   further	  question:	  which	  animals,	   exactly,	   can	   suffer?	  Here	   there	  are	  
formidable	   methodological	   barriers	   to	   investigation	   (Allen	   and	   Trestman	   2014,	   §4).	   The	   core	  
problem	  is	  that	  we	  have	  no	  direct	  access	  to	  animals’	  experiential	  states,	  so	  we	  must	  reason	  about	  
their	   inner	   lives	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   behavioral,	   functional,	   neurobiological	   and	   evolutionary	  
considerations.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  strongest	  case	  for	  suffering	  can	  be	  made	  for	  mammals,	  where	  
the	  evolutionary	  and	  neurobiological	  parallels	  with	  humans	  are	  closest.	  However,	  we	  should	  not	  
assume	  that	  only	  mammals	  can	  experience	  pain;	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  evidence	  for	  pain	  
experience	   in	   all	   vertebrates	   (Varner	   2003),	   and	   in	   many	   cases	   we	   may	   simply	   lack	   adequate	  
empirical	  knowledge	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  issue.	  Especially	  hard	  cases	  include	  cephalopods	  such	  
as	   squid,	   which	   are	   behaviorally	   very	   sophisticated	   but	   evolutionarily	   distant	   from	   us.	   My	  
approach	  to	  this	  issue	  invokes	  a	  modest	  sort	  of	  precautionary	  principle:	  Because	  we	  are	  not	  in	  a	  
position	   to	  be	  confident	  about	  whether	  birds,	   fish,	   and	  cephalopods	  can	  suffer,	  we	  are	  not	   in	  a	  
position	  to	  know	  whether	  we	  act	  wrongly	  when	  we	  eat	  them.	  Indifference	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  
we	  act	  wrongly	  is	  a	  vice,	  and	  we	  should	  avoid	  eating	  these	  animals	  on	  that	  basis.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There	  might,	   however,	   be	   other	   arguments	   that	   count	   against	   eating	   animals	   that	   cannot	   suffer:	   for	   example,	   one	  
could	   offer	   environmental	   objections	   to	   how	   some	   such	   animals	   are	   raised	   or	   harvested,	   or	   appeal	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  
simply	  being	  a	  fellow	  animal	  is	  morally	  significant. 
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A	   second	   powerful	   way	   to	   find	   objections	   to	   a	   premise	   is	   to	   identify	   an	   important	  
distinction	  that	  the	  argument	  for	  that	  premise	  ignores.	  For	  example,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  Premise	  
One	  of	   the	  model	   essay	  becomes	   less	   plausible	   once	  we	  make	   the	  distinction	  between	  being	   in	  
pain	   and	   suffering.	   Some	   philosophers	   grant	   that	  many	   animals	   can	   be	   in	   pain.	  However,	   they	  
suggest	   that	   suffering	   requires	   something	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   in	   pain	   that	   most	   non-­‐human	  
animals	   lack.	  For	  example,	  perhaps	   it	  requires	  a	  conscious	  belief:	   that	  I	  am	  having	  this	  pain	   (for	  
discussion,	  see	  Akhtar	  2011,	  496-­‐499).	  An	  objector	  might	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  suffering	  in	  this	  sense	  –	  
and	  not	  merely	  being	   in	  pain	  –	  that	   is	  ethically	  significant.	   If	   this	  were	  true,	   then	  my	  argument	  
would	  at	  very	  least	  be	  incomplete:	  I	  would	  need	  to	  discuss	  the	  nature	  of	  suffering	  more	  carefully,	  
and	  then	  explore	  which	  animals	  can	  experience	  it.	  	  
The	  best	   reply	   to	   this	   objection	  begins	  by	   emphasizing	   that	   important	   issue	  here	   is	   not	  
how	  we	  should	  use	  the	  word	  suffering	  (in	  philosophy	  you	  should	  usually	  avoid	  fighting	  about	  how	  
to	  use	  words).	  It	  is	  rather	  whether	  conscious	  belief	  (or	  something	  like	  it)	  is	  required	  for	  pain	  to	  be	  
ethically	  significant.	  If	  we	  are	  clear	  on	  this	  point,	  another	  extreme	  case	  shows	  why	  this	  objection	  
fails.	  The	  most	  intense	  pains	  tend	  to	  fully	  occupy	  us:	  one	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  thinking	  anything	  –	  let	  
alone	   this	  pain	   is	  happening	   to	  me	   –	  when	   in	  utter	   agony.	  But	   surely	   it	   is	  wrong	   to	   inflict	  utter	  
agony	  on	  someone,	  because	  of	  how	  awful	  it	  feels	  (compare	  Rachels	  2011,	  898).	  This	  shows	  that	  it	  
can	  be	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  pain	  that	  does	  not	  count	  as	  suffering	  in	  the	  objector’s	  stipulated	  sense.	  If	  
this	  is	  true	  of	  agonizing	  pains,	  it	  should	  be	  true	  of	  less	  intense	  pains.	  And	  if	  it	  is	  true	  for	  our	  own	  
case,	  it	  should	  be	  true	  for	  animals	  as	  well.	  I	  thus	  conclude	  that	  this	  objection	  fails.	  	  
A	   third	  way	   to	   object	   to	   an	   ethical	   premise	   is	   to	   identify	   and	   defend	   an	   independently	  
plausible	   ethical	   principle	   that	   conflicts	  with	   it.	   You	  may	  have	   encountered	   such	   a	   principle	   in	  
your	  previous	  study	  of	  ethics,	  or	  you	  might	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  one	  yourself.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  
strategy	  is	  to	  argue	  against	  Premise	  One	  of	  the	  model	  argument	  by	  appealing	  to	  contractualism,	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which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  contemporary	  approaches	  to	  ethics	  and	  political	  philosophy.	  
The	   basic	   idea	   of	   contractualism	   is	   that	   moral	   (or	   political)	   principles	   are	   principles	   that	  
reasonable	   persons	   would	   agree	   to	   as	   rules	   to	   govern	   their	   lives	   together.	   So	   understood,	  
contractualism	   can	   seem	   to	   cast	   serious	   doubt	   on	   the	   ethical	   significance	   of	   animals.	   As	   Peter	  
Carruthers	  notes,	   according	   to	   the	   contractualist,	   “Morality	   is	   viewed	   as	   constructed	  by	  human	  
beings,	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   interactions	   between	   human	   beings…”	   (1992,	   102,	   emphasis	   his).	  
Because	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   a	   principle	   like	   Premise	   One	   would	   help	   to	   facilitate	   such	  
interactions,	  contractualism	  may	  seem	  to	  give	  us	  good	  reasons	  to	  reject	  this	  premise.	  	  
I	   have	   two	   interlocking	   replies	   to	   this	   objection.	   First,	   the	   most	   plausible	   forms	   of	  
contractualism	   do	   not	   have	   the	   implications	   that	   the	   objector	   claims.	   Exemplary	   here	   is	   T.	  M.	  
Scanlon’s	  extremely	   influential	   contractualist	  ethical	   theory.	  Scanlon	   is	  careful	   to	  argue	   that	  his	  
theory	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  protect	  animals	  (1998,	   177-­‐84).	  Further,	  Scanlon	  is	  clear	  that	  we	  have	  
strong	  reasons	  that	  are	  not	  based	  in	  the	  contractual	  principle,	  so	  his	  view	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  
idea	  that	  we	  might	  have	  such	  reasons	  not	  to	  harm	  animals.	  Other	  philosophers	  have	  been	  more	  
ambitious,	  offering	  contractualist	  arguments	  on	  behalf	  of	  animals	  (Rowlands	  2002,	  Ch.	  3;	  Talbert	  
2006).	  
Of	   course,	   there	   are	   some	   contractualist	   theories	   that	   have	   the	   implications	   that	  
Carruthers	  suggests.	  But	  these	  are	  controversial	  views	  among	  contractualists,	  and	  contractualism	  
itself	  is	  only	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  controversial	  and	  competing	  general	  ethical	  theories.	  Because	  of	  
this	   controversy,	   however,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   we	   should	   be	   confident	   in	   the	   truth	   of	   these	  
contractualist	   theories.	  Without	   such	   confidence,	  however,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	  how	   these	   theories	  
could	   give	   us	   good	   reasons	   to	   reject	   Premise	   One.	   Further,	   the	   case	   of	   animals	   is	   exactly	   one	  
where	  these	  theories	  appear	  implausible.	  Because	  it	  is	  obviously	  wrong	  for	  me	  to	  torture	  puppies	  
just	  for	  fun,	  it	  counts	  against	  a	  moral	  theory	  that	  implies	  otherwise.	  This	  sort	  of	  case	  is	  part	  of	  a	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deep	  and	  more	  general	  challenge.	  As	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  (2006)	  and	  others	  have	  argued,	  many	  of	  
our	  most	  important	  moral	  concerns	  address	  the	  interests	  of	  distinctively	  vulnerable	  parties	  (such	  
as	   children,	   the	   severely	  mentally	   handicapped,	   and	   animals),	   and	   not	   simply	   the	   interactions	  
between	   equally	   capable	   adult	   humans.	   A	   contractualism	   that	   ignores	   these	   interests	   is	  
indefensible.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  it	  will	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  mount	  a	  compelling	  case	  
against	  Premise	  One	  of	  my	  argument	  that	  appeals	  to	  contractualism.	  	  	  	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   have	   considered	   three	   kinds	   of	   objections	   to	   Premise	   One	   of	   my	  
argument.	  An	  important	  part	  of	  my	  reply	  has	  been	  concessive,	  refining	  the	  premise	  that	  I	  want	  to	  
defend:	  so	  refined,	  the	  thesis	  states	  that	  it	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  inflict	  pain	  on	  a	  range	  of	  animals,	  
including	  at	  least	  all	  mammals.	  So	  refined,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  reasonably	  
reject	  this	  premise.	  	  	  
	  	  
Premise	  Two:	  killing	  animals	  
Premise	  Two	  of	  the	  model	  argument	  says:	  	  
2. If	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer,	  then	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals	  
This	  premise	   is	  conditional.	   In	  order	   to	   successfully	   object	   to	   a	   conditional,	   one	  would	  need	   to	  
find	   a	   reasonable	   way	   to	   accept	   the	   antecedent	   (i.e.	   the	   first	   part)	   of	   the	   conditional,	   while	  
rejecting	  the	  consequent	  (i.e.	  the	  second	  part).	  Here,	  this	  would	  mean	  granting	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  
make	   animals	   suffer,	   and	   arguing	   that	   it	   is	   nonetheless	   okay	   to	   kill	   them.	   I	  will	   consider	   three	  
strategies	   for	   objecting	   to	   this	   premise.	   These	   strategies	   all	   target	   my	   explanation	   of	   why	   we	  
should	  accept	   this	  premise.	  This	  was	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  wrongness	  of	  killing	   is	  well-­‐explained	  by	  
the	   fact	   that	   killing	   deprives	   the	   victim	   of	   a	   valuable	   future.	   The	   first	   strategy	   appeals	   to	   a	  
competing	   explanation,	   the	   second	   strategy	  objects	   that	  my	   explanation	   is	   incomplete,	   and	   the	  
third	  objects	  that	  my	  explanation	  has	  a	  false	  presupposition.	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   Just	  as	  a	  promising	  objection	  can	  be	  based	  in	  a	  competing	  ethical	  principle,	  so	  we	  can	  base	  
an	  objection	  in	  a	  competing	  ethical	  explanation.	  In	  arguing	  for	  Premise	  Two,	  I	  offered	  a	  general	  
explanation	  of	  the	  wrongness	  of	  killing:	  that	  killing	  can	  be	  wrong	  because	  it	  deprives	  the	  victim	  of	  
a	   valuable	   future.	   One	   seemingly	   competing	   explanation	   is	   that	   killing	   you	   would	   be	   wrong	  
because	   it	   would	   violate	   your	   autonomy.	  Violation	   here	   includes	   two	   important	   and	   separable	  
ideas.	  First,	  killing	  you	  would	  interfere	  with	  your	  exercise	  of	  your	  autonomy.	  You	  cannot	  live	  your	  
life	  in	  the	  way	  you	  choose	  if	  you	  are	  dead.	  Second,	  killing	  you	  would	  be	  a	  way	  of	  failing	  to	  respect	  
your	  autonomy:	  if	  I	  take	  myself	  to	  be	  licensed	  to	  kill	  you,	  I	  take	  myself	  to	  have	  the	  right	  to	  ride	  
roughshod	  over	  your	  own	  view	  of	  how	  your	  life	  should	  go.	  	  
In	  certain	  cases,	  this	  explanation	  of	  the	  wrongness	  of	  killing	  may	  seem	  markedly	  superior	  
to	  the	  ‘valuable	  future’	  explanation	  offered	  in	  the	  model	  essay.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  Alice	  is	  
near	   death	   and	   in	   pain,	   but	   wishes	   to	   continue	   living.	   If	   I	   inject	   her	   with	   a	   lethal	   dose	   of	  
morphine,	   I	  wrongly	   kill	   her.	   (Notice	   that	   this	   is	   another	   instance	   of	   using	   an	   extreme	   case	   to	  
make	   a	   point.)	   The	   best	   explanation	   here	   is	   that	   I	   have	   wrongly	   failed	   to	   respect	   her	   right	   to	  
autonomously	  determine	  whether	  she	  continues	  to	  live.	  By	  contrast,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  I	  deprive	  
her	   of	   a	   valuable	   future	   at	   all.	   Because	   most	   non-­‐human	   animals	   are	   not	   autonomous	   agents	  
(there	   may	   be	   borderline	   cases	   of	   non-­‐human	   agency,	   such	   as	   chimpanzees),	   this	   competing	  
explanation	  suggests	  that	  Premise	  Two	  is	  false.	  	  
	   To	   see	   why	   this	   objection	   is	   not	   promising,	   notice	   that	   the	   autonomy-­‐violation	  
explanation	  also	  clearly	   fails	   in	  some	  cases.	  Because	  you	  are	  an	  autonomous	  agent,	   I	  should	  not	  
force	  you	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  at	  a	  certain	  time,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  good	  for	  you	  to	  do	  so.	  By	  contrast,	  I	  act	  rightly	  
when	  I	  paternalistically	   force	  my	  three-­‐year-­‐old	  son	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  at	  an	  appropriate	  time.	  This	   is	  
because	   he	   is	   not	   an	   autonomous	   agent.	   It	  would	   obviously	   be	   very	  wrong	   to	   kill	  my	   son,	   but	  
since	  he	  is	  not	  an	  autonomous	  agent,	  this	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  autonomy	  violation.	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You	  might	  think	  that	  this	  leaves	  us	  at	  an	  impasse:	  we	  have	  two	  candidate	  explanations	  of	  
the	   wrongness	   of	   killing	   (valuable	   future-­‐deprivation	   and	   autonomy-­‐violation)	   and	   counter-­‐
examples	  to	  each.	  Does	  this	  show	  that	  both	  must	  be	  bad	  explanations?	  No.	  A	  better	  diagnosis	  is	  
that	   each	   of	   these	   accounts	   provides	   a	   typically	   sufficient	   but	   not	   necessary	   explanation	   of	   the	  
wrongness	  of	  killing.	  That	  is:	  killing	  can	  be	  wrong	  either	  because	  it	  violates	  autonomy,	  or	  because	  
it	  deprives	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  valuable	  future	  (or	  both).	  On	  this	  account,	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  it	  is	  
uncontroversial	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  an	  adult	  human	  in	  a	  range	  of	  ordinary	  circumstances	  is	  that	  
there	   are	   several	   different	   things	   wrong	   with	   such	   killing.	   Because	   Premise	   Two	   of	   the	  model	  
argument	   requires	   only	   that	   the	   valuable	   future-­‐deprivation	   explanation	   is	   typically	   sufficient,	  
this	  reply	  vindicates	  that	  premise.	  	  	  
	   Another	  important	  way	  to	  object	  to	  an	  ethical	  principle	  or	  explanation	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  
incomplete.	  Whenever	  someone	  offers	  a	  principle	  or	  explanation,	  it	  is	  always	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  ask:	  is	  
that	  all	  that	  is	  doing	  the	  important	  explanatory	  work	  here?	  Or	  have	  I	  only	  been	  given	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
best	  ethical	  principle	  that	  applies	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  case?	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  a	  future’s	  
merely	  being	  valuable	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  must	  not	  eliminate	  it.	  Suppose	  that	  my	  
wife	   and	   I	   were	   debating	   whether	   to	   have	   another	   child.	   If	   we	   did,	   that	   child	   would	   almost	  
certainly	  have	  a	  valuable	  future.	  But	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  I	  do	  no	  wrong	  simply	  by	  preventing	  that	  
future:	  my	  having	  had	  a	  vasectomy	  does	  not	  make	  me	  akin	  to	  a	  murderer.	  Michael	  Tooley	  (1972)	  
proposes	  an	  explanation	  of	  this	  fact:	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  wrong	  to	  deprive	  an	  entity	  of	  a	  valuable	  
future,	  that	  entity	  needs	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  care	  about	  its	  own	  continued	  existence.	  Because	  
the	  child	  I	  do	  not	  conceive	  does	  not	  currently	  exist,	  it	  cannot	  care	  about	  its	  future	  existence,	  and	  
hence	  I	  do	  not	  wrong	  it	  by	  preventing	  its	  future,	  on	  Tooley’s	  view.	  One	  might	  appeal	  to	  Tooley’s	  
view	   to	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   not	   wrong	   to	   kill	   most	   animals	   because	   they	   are	   not	   cognitively	  
sophisticated	  enough	  to	  care	  about	  their	  continued	  existence.	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   It	   is	  not	  obvious	  whether	  some	  animals	  can	  care	  about	  their	  futures	  in	  the	  relevant	  way.	  
However,	  I	  set	  this	  aside,	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  arguing	  against	  Tooley’s	  explanatory	  claim	  (notice	  
that	  I	  do	  so	  by	  appealing	  to	  extreme	  cases	  reasoning).	  Suppose	  that	  artificial	  intelligence	  research	  
advances	   to	   the	   point	   that	   we	   are	   capable	   of	   creating	   intelligent	   and	   autonomous	   androids,	  
capable	  of	  almost	  everything	  humans	  are:	   sophisticated	  reasoning,	   love,	  physical	  and	  emotional	  
pain,	  etc.	  Suppose	  this	  type	  of	  android	  is	  programmed	  to	  be	  simply	  incapable	  of	  caring	  about	  its	  
own	  continued	  existence,	  although	  it	  can	  and	  typically	  does	  care	  deeply	  about	  particular	  others.	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  programming,	  such	  androids	  would	  be	  predictably	  prone	  to	  certain	  tragic	  behavior:	  
they	  would	  sometimes	  lay	  down	  their	   lives	  to	  save	  others	  from	  inconsequential	  harms.	  It	  would	  
be	   obviously	   wrong	   to	   kill	   such	   an	   android	   –	   even	   with	   its	   consent	   –	   to	   save	   yourself	   from	   a	  
splinter.	  The	  android’s	  inability	  to	  care	  about	  its	  future	  is	  a	  rational	  imperfection,	  but	  not	  one	  that	  
licenses	  killing	  it.	  	  
	   We	  can	  square	  our	  judgments	  about	  the	  nonexistent	  child	  and	  the	  android	  if	  we	  suggest	  
that	  the	  android	  is	  (imagined	  to	  be)	  an	  ethically	  significant	  being	  that	  now	  exists,	  while	  the	  non-­‐
existent	  child	  is	  a	  merely	  possible	  entity.	  We	  can	  then	  amend	  our	  ethical	  explanation	  as	  follows:	  it	  
is	   wrong	   to	   deprive	   existing	   creatures	   of	   valuable	   futures,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   wrong	   to	   prevent	   non-­‐
existing	   entities	   from	   coming	   into	   existence.	   This	   explanation	   implies	   that	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   kill	  
existing	  animals,	  and	  so	  supports	  Premise	  Two.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   A	  third	  way	  to	  object	  to	  an	  explanation	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  has	  a	  false	  presupposition.	  That	  
is:	   it	   works	   only	   by	   implicitly	   assuming	   some	   false	   claim.	   One	   crucial	   presupposition	   of	   my	  
explanation	  of	  the	  wrongness	  of	  killing	  animals	  is	  that	  if	  I	  refrain	  from	  killing	  a	  cow	  today,	  there	  is	  
a	  single	  moral	  patient	  –	  the	  cow	  –	  that	  will	  enjoy	  various	  pleasant	  cow	  experiences	  in	  the	  future.	  
The	  objector	  suggests	  that	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  doubt	  this,	  if	  we	  think	  carefully	  about	  the	  conditions	  
for	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  a	  given	  moral	  patient.	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The	   objection	   can	   be	   initially	   motivated	   by	   another	   extreme	   case:	   suppose	   that	   a	   mad	  
scientist	  was	  able	  to	  map	  the	  neural	  structure	  of	  our	  brains,	  and	  then	  swap	  those	  structures:	  your	  
brain	  is	  ‘wiped’	  and	  then	  rebuilt	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  map	  of	  my	  brain,	  so	  that	  your	  body	  is	  now	  
the	   home	   of	   beliefs,	   desires,	   and	   ‘memories’	   near	   identical	   to	   mine	   (pre-­‐operation),	   and	   vice-­‐
versa.	   Suppose	   that	   the	  mad	   scientist	   performs	   this	   swap	   shortly	   after	   I	   injected	  my	  own	  heart	  
with	  a	  slow-­‐acting	  but	   lethal	  poison.	  Arguably,	   thanks	  to	   the	  mad	  scientist’s	   intervention,	   I	  will	  
have	  survived,	  and	  succeeded	  in	  killing	  you,	  rather	  than	  myself.	  	  	  	  	  
Some	  philosophers	  use	  cases	   like	  these	  to	  argue	  that	  psychological	  continuity	   is	  required	  
for	  personal	   identity	  or	  ethically	  significant	  survival.	   In	  the	  case	  above,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  I	  survive	  
the	  operation	  because	   the	   surviving	  body	  houses	   a	  psychology	   that	   is	   continuous	  with	  my	  pre-­‐
operation	  psychology.	  This	  sort	  of	  case	  matters	  to	  my	  argument	  for	  the	  following	  reason.	  Suppose	  
that	  the	  psychological	  connections	  across	  the	  life	  of	  a	  cow	  are	  not	  very	  rich.	  Then,	  in	  killing	  the	  
cow	  now,	  I	  may	  be	  depriving	  it	  of	  only	  an	  inconsequential	  amount	  of	  valuable	  future.	  I	  will	  also	  be	  
preventing	  a	  series	  of	   future	   ‘cows’	   from	  coming	   into	  existence	  and	  enjoying	   life.	  But	  as	  we	  saw	  
from	  the	  nonexistent	  child	  case,	  it	  appears	  not	  to	  be	  wrong	  to	  refrain	  from	  bringing	  into	  existence	  
beings	  with	  valuable	  futures.	  	  
	   This	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  central	  issue:	  do	  animals	  have	  rich	  enough	  psychological	  connections	  
to	  underwrite	  the	  intuitive	  thought	  that	  a	  given	  cow	  (e.g.)	  is	  the	  same	  moral	  patient	  over	  time?	  I	  
am	  cautiously	  optimistic	  that	  they	  do,	  in	  at	  least	  many	  cases.	  For	  example,	  many	  animals	  appear	  
capable	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  memory	  (Allen	  and	  Trestman	  2014,	  §7.4).	  However,	  as	  with	  questions	  
about	   animal	   pain	   and	   suffering,	   answers	   here	   are	   likely	   to	   vary	   substantially	   across	   species	   in	  
ways	  that	  require	  careful	  empirical	  work	  to	  tease	  out.	  
	   It	   is	  worth	  making	   two	   further	   points.	   First,	   theories	   of	   personal	   identity	   –	   and	   related	  
claims	  about	  the	  persistence	  of	  a	  given	  moral	  patient	  –	  are	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  The	  view	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that	  psychological	  continuity	  is	  the	  criterion	  of	  ethically	  significant	  survival	  is	  controversial.	  And	  
on	  many	   competing	   views	   –	   on	  which	  organism	  continuity,	   or	   brain	   continuity	   can	  underwrite	  
ethically	   significant	   survival,	   for	   example	   –	   the	   objection	   will	   fail	   immediately.	   Second,	   the	  
precautionary	   approach	   to	   practical	   ethics	   that	   I	   advocated	   in	   the	   preceding	   section	   is	   again	  
relevant	  here.	  This	  objection	  certainly	  reveals	  deep	  complexities	  ignored	  by	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  
model	  essay.	  However,	  we	   should	  only	  be	  content	   to	   reject	   that	  argument	   if	   these	  complexities	  
lead	  us	  to	  be	  confident	  that	  it	  is	  not	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals.	  	  
	   In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  appeal	  to	  autonomy-­‐violation	  complements	  –	  rather	  
than	  competes	  with	  –	  the	  valuable	  future-­‐deprivation	  account	  of	  the	  wrongness	  of	  killing.	  I	  also	  
argued	   that	   it	   can	  be	  wrong	   to	  kill	   a	  being	   that	   is	   incapable	  of	   caring	   about	   its	   own	  continued	  
existence.	   In	   discussing	   this	   issue,	   I	   amended	   the	   ethical	   principle	   I	   endorse	   to	   claim	   that	   it	   is	  
wrong	   to	  deprive	  an	  existing	  moral	  patient	  of	   the	  valuable	   future	   that	   it	  would	  otherwise	  have.	  
And	   I	   argued	   that	  many	   animals	   are	   probably	   the	   same	  moral	   patient	   across	   time	   (although	   I	  
granted	  that	  the	  issues	  here	  are	  quire	  complex).	  	  
	  
Premise	  Three:	  using	  animal	  products	  
Premise	  Three	  of	  the	  model	  argument	  is	  the	  claim	  that:	   	  	  	  	  
3. If	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals,	  then	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat	  
I	  argued	  for	  this	  claim	  by	  defending	  another	  ethical	  principle:	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  be	  complicit	  in	  
wrongdoing:	  to	  benefit	  from	  that	  wrongdoing,	  and	  to	  support	  it.	  Here	  we	  can	  ask	  two	  questions:	  
should	  we	  accept	  this	  principle,	  and	  does	  it	  really	  support	  Premise	  Three?	  In	  this	  section	  I	  begin	  
by	   considering	   an	   objection	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   this	   principle	   supports	   Premise	   Three,	   before	  
considering	  whether	  this	  principle	  is	  objectionably	  incomplete.	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   It	  is	  always	  wise	  to	  consider	  whether	  an	  ethical	  principle	  really	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  it	  
is	   intended	   to.	  Consider	   a	   case	   that	   illustrates	   this	   sort	  of	   objection	   to	  Premise	  Three.	   Suppose	  
Alice	   is	   driving	   carefully	   on	   a	   country	   road,	   when	   a	   deer	   jumps	   in	   front	   of	   her	   truck	   without	  
warning.	  The	  deer	  is	  killed	  instantly,	  and	  Alice	  moves	  its	  carcass	  to	  the	  side	  of	  the	  road	  and	  leaves.	  
Zoe,	  who	  lives	  nearby,	  sees	  all	  of	  this.	  Zoe	  knows	  how	  to	  dress	  a	  deer	  carcass	  and	  has	  a	  taste	  for	  
venison.	   She	   takes	   the	   carcass	   home,	   dresses	   it,	   cooks	   some,	   and	   eats	   it	   (compare	   Bruckner,	  
forthcoming	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  cases	  like	  this	  one).	  In	  this	  scenario,	  Zoe	  knowingly	  prepared	  
and	  ate	  meat.	  But	  in	  doing	  so,	  Zoe	  is	  not	  complicit	  in	  any	  wrongdoing:	  Alice’s	  killing	  of	  the	  deer	  
was	   neither	  malicious	   nor	   negligent,	   so	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   it	   could	   be	  wrong.	   This	   is	   a	   case	  
where	  eating	  meat	  is	  not	  complicit	  in	  wrongful	  killing,	  so	  it	  is	  a	  case	  where	  Premise	  Three	  fails	  to	  
hold,	  even	  if	  the	  principle	  I	  offer	  is	  true.	  	  
I	  am	  happy	  to	  grant	  the	  objector	  this	  case.	  Recall	  that	  my	  conclusion	  is	  that	  eating	  meat	  is	  
typically	   wrong.	   This	   case	   helpfully	   brings	   out	   another	   atypical	   exception.	   The	   objection	   lacks	  
more	  general	   force	  exactly	  because	   in	   the	  overwhelming	  majority	  cases,	   the	  meat	   that	  we	  eat	   is	  
wrongfully	  produced	  (at	  least	  if	  the	  arguments	  for	  Premises	  One	  and	  Two	  are	  sound).	  
	   We	   saw	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   that	   a	   good	   strategy	   for	   finding	   objections	   to	   an	  
explanation	   is	   to	   challenge	   its	   completeness.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   for	   ethical	   principles	   like	   my	  
complicity	   principle.	   We	   can	   challenge	   the	   completeness	   of	   my	   principle	   by	   arguing	   that	  
complicity	  with	   the	  wrongful	   treatment	   of	   animals	   could	  only	   be	  wrong	   if	   it	   tended	   to	  make	   a	  
difference	   to	   how	  much	  wrongful	   treatment	   there	  was	   (see	  Appiah	   1986-­‐7	   for	   a	   version	   of	   this	  
view	  about	  complicity).	  I	  will	  call	  this	  the	  efficacy	  objection.	  This	  objection	  has	  significant	  force:	  
one	  might	  wonder	  what	  the	  point	  of	  avoiding	  complicity	  is,	  if	  it	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  how	  much	  
animal	  suffering	  occurs.	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Because	   I	   take	   this	   to	   be	   the	   single	   most	   important	   challenge	   to	   the	   argument	   of	   the	  
model	   paper,	   I	   will	   offer	   three	   potentially	   complementary	   replies.	   (Please	   note	   that	   I	   offer	  
multiple	  replies	  to	  help	  illustrate	  the	  issues	  here.	  In	  general	  you	  should	  focus	  on	  developing	  the	  
single	  strongest	  reply	  to	  an	  objection	  as	  clearly	  as	  you	  can,	  rather	  than	  offering	  multiple	  replies.)	  
	   The	  first	  reply	  accepts	  the	  objection,	  and	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat	  because	  doing	  
so	  does	   tend	   to	  make	   a	  difference	   to	   the	   amount	  of	  mistreatment	  of	   animals.	  This	  might	   seem	  
absurd:	  by	  the	  time	  I	  buy	  a	  chicken	  at	  the	  store	  (for	  example)	  it	  is	  already	  dead.	  And	  the	  idea	  that	  
every	   chicken	   bought	   will	   cause	   another	   one	   to	   be	   raised,	   made	   to	   suffer,	   and	   then	   killed,	   is	  
plainly	  false.	  Peter	  Singer	  (1980,	  335-­‐6,	  and	  following	  him,	  Norcross	  2004,	  Kagan	  2011,	  and	  Rachels	  
2011)	  has	  replied	  to	  this	  challenge	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  There	  must	  be	  some	  change	  in	  demand	  for	  
chicken	   that	   the	   market	   would	   notice.	   For	   example,	   Singer	   imagines	   that	   for	   every	   10,000	  
vegetarians,	   there	  would	   be	   one	   fewer	   20,000-­‐bird	   broiler	   factory,	   harming	   and	   killing	   100,000	  
chickens	  a	  year.	  He	  imagines	  further	  that	  if	  we	  were	  just	  below	  the	  threshold	  –	  if	  xxx9,999	  people	  
were	  vegetarian	  –	  the	  last	  9,999	  vegetarians	  would	  save	  no	  chickens,	  because	  demand	  for	  chicken	  
would	  be	  just	  above	  the	  threshold	  that	  triggers	  a	  change	  in	  supply.	  Given	  these	  assumptions,	  and	  
given	   that	   we	   do	   not	   know	   exactly	   how	  many	   other	   vegetarians	   there	   are,	   someone	   becoming	  
vegetarian	  has	  only	  a	  1/10,000	  chance	  of	  making	  any	  difference	  to	  the	  number	  of	  chickens	  made	  to	  
suffer	  and	  die.	  	  
That	   sounds	   depressing.	   But	   Singer	   argues	   that	   we	   should	   pay	   attention	   to	   the	   other	  
numbers:	  if	  one	  is	  that	  1/10,000,	  one	  will	  save	  100,000	  chickens	  a	  year.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  expected	  
effect	   of	   becoming	   vegetarian	   is	   the	   effect	   you	  would	  have	   if	   you	  make	   a	   difference	  divided	  by	  
your	  chance	  of	  making	  that	  difference;	  in	  the	  example,	  saving	  100,000/10,000=10	  chickens	  a	  year	  
from	  short	  but	  awful	  lives.	  Of	  course,	  these	  precise	  numbers	  are	  merely	  illustrative;	  Singer	  grants	  
that	   we	   do	   not	   know	   where	   exactly	   the	   thresholds	   are.	   But	   he	   suggests	   that	   the	   structure	   of	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probable	   effects	   will	   be	   similar	   on	   any	   reasonable	   hypothesis	   about	   these	   thresholds.	   So,	  
according	  to	  Singer,	  while	  any	  reduction	  or	  increase	  in	  one’s	  meat	  consumption	  has	  a	  tiny	  chance	  
of	  making	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  wrongful	  animal	  suffering	  and	  death,	  the	  difference	  you	  
will	  make	  if	  you	  do	  make	  a	  difference	  will	  be	  correspondingly	  huge.	  And	  this,	  it	  might	  be	  claimed,	  
is	   what	   makes	   it	   wrong	   to	   eat	   meat.	   If	   Singer’s	   reasoning	   is	   sound,	   it	   answers	   the	   efficacy	  
objection:	  complicity	  is	  wrong	  in	  part	  because	  it	  has	  an	  ethically	  significant	  chance	  of	  making	  an	  
ethically	   significant	   difference.	   While	   Singer’s	   reply	   is	   promising,	   his	   argument	   is	   somewhat	  
complex,	   and	   relies	   on	   some	   controversial	   assumptions	   (see	   Budolfson	  ms.	   for	   an	   important	  
reply).	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  I	  will	  explore	  alternative	  ways	  of	  replying	  to	  the	  efficacy	  objection.	  
Singer’s	  argument	   illustrates	   two	   important	   ideas	  worth	  keeping	   in	  mind	   in	  your	  ethical	  
reasoning.	  First,	  sometimes	  the	  expected	  effects	  of	  your	  actions	  are	  ethically	  significant,	  and	  not	  
just	  their	  actual	  effects.	  (In	  this	  case,	  the	  alleged	  expected	  effect	  of	  being	  a	  vegetarian	  is	  sparing	  
ten	   chickens	   a	   year	   from	   short	   and	   awful	   lives,	   even	   if	   for	  most	   vegetarians,	   there	   is	   no	   actual	  
effect	  on	  chicken	  well-­‐being.)	  Second,	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  action,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  
important	  to	  step	  back	  from	  focusing	  on	  the	  particular	  act,	  and	  think	  about	  how	  that	  act	  fits	  into	  
overall	  patterns.	  
A	  second	  response	  to	  the	  efficacy	  objection	  appeals	  to	  these	  patterns	   in	  another	  way,	  by	  
focusing	  on	  the	  ethical	  significance	  of	  what	  groups	  of	  people	  do	  together.	  One	  advantage	  of	  this	  
approach	   is	   that	   it	   is	   uncontroversial	   that	  meat-­‐eaters	   as	   a	   group	   do	   make	   a	   difference	   to	   the	  
amount	  of	  animal	  suffering:	  if	  there	  were	  no	  omnivores	  there	  would	  be	  no	  factory	  farms.	  	  	  
I	   will	   introduce	   the	   key	   idea	   with	   another	   example.	   Suppose	   that	   there	   are	   two	   small	  
cities,	  Upstream	  and	  Downstream,	  along	  the	  same	  river.	  The	  river	  is	  the	  only	  available	  source	  of	  
water	  for	  the	  households	  in	  each	  city.	  Each	  household	  in	  each	  city	  draws	  its	  water	  from	  the	  river	  
as	  the	  river	  comes	  into	  the	  city,	  and	  dumps	  its	  sewage	  in	  the	  river	  as	  it	  flows	  out	  of	  the	  city.	  The	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sewage	  dumped	   in	   the	   river	   in	  Upstream	   flows	  down	   the	   river	   and	  pollutes	   the	  drinking	  water	  
drawn	   from	   the	   river	   in	   Downstream.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   people	   in	   Downstream	   are	   constantly	  
getting	   seriously	   ill	   and	   dying.	   Suppose	   that	   each	   household	   in	  Upstream	   could,	   at	   small	   cost,	  
bury	   their	  sewage	   instead	  of	  dumping	   it	   in	   the	  river.	   If	  everyone	   in	  Upstream	  did	  this,	   it	  would	  
end	  the	  health	  catastrophe	  in	  Downstream.	  However,	  given	  the	  number	  of	  other	  households	  that	  
are	  actually	  polluting,	  a	  single	  person	  in	  Upstream	  burying	  his	  sewage	  would	  not	  save	  anyone	  in	  
Downstream	  from	  illness	  or	  death.	  	  
It	   seems	   plausible	   that	   the	   sewage-­‐dumpers	   in	   Upstream	   together	   wrongfully	   cause	  
massive	   amounts	   of	   suffering	   and	   death	   in	  Downstream.	  Anyone	   in	  Upstream	  who	   dumps	   her	  
sewage	  in	  the	  river	  is	  thus	  part	  of	  a	  group	  that	  acts	  wrongly.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  cease	  to	  be	  part	  of	  that	  
group,	  however:	  one	  need	  only	  bury	  one’s	  sewage.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  one	  should	  bury	  one’s	  
sewage	  in	  this	  situation,	  rather	  than	  dump	  it	  into	  the	  river.	  We	  could	  explain	  this	  by	  appealing	  to	  
the	  following	  ethical	  principle:	   if	  one	  can	  avoid	  being	  part	  of	  a	  group	  that	  together	  does	  serious	  
wrong,	  then	  one	  acts	  wrongly	  by	  continuing	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  that	  group.	  This	  principle	  applies	  
neatly	   to	   eating	  meat.	   Together,	   the	  meat-­‐eaters	  make	   a	   tremendous	   difference:	   without	   their	  
demand	   for	  meat,	   no	  one	  would	   cause	   animals	   to	   suffer	   and	  die	   in	   order	   to	  produce	   it.	   So	   the	  
meat-­‐eaters	   together	  make	  vast	  amounts	  of	  wrongful	  pain	  and	  death	  happen	   to	  animals.	  So,	  by	  
the	  ethical	  principle	  just	  proposed,	  one	  acts	  wrongly	  by	  continuing	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  that	  group.	  	  
This	   reply	   answers	   the	   efficacy	   objection	   by	   appealing	   to	   group	   efficacy.	   However,	   the	  
issue	   of	   when	   exactly	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   remain	   a	   part	   of	   an	   ethically	   objectionable	   group	   is	   very	  
complicated.	   (Sometimes,	   for	   example,	   it	   is	   only	   by	   being	   part	   of	   such	   a	   group	   that	   one	   can	  
mitigate	   the	   bad	   things	   the	   group	   does.)	   So	   I	   will	   explore	   another	   alternative	   response	   to	   the	  
efficacy	  objection,	  which	  is	  the	  one	  I	  find	  most	  promising.	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This	  response	  directly	  rejects	  the	  efficacy	  objection,	  and	  defends	  the	  claim	  that	  complicity	  
with	  wrongdoing	  can	  be	  a	  sufficient	  explanation	  for	  wrongdoing,	  even	   if	   it	  has	  no	  expected	  bad	  
effects.	   I	  will	   defend	   this	   response	   in	   three	  ways:	   by	   appealing	   to	   a	   plausibly	   analogous	   ethical	  
principle,	  by	  clarifying	  the	  anti-­‐complicity	  principle,	  and	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  variant	  on	  an	  earlier	  
case	  that	  helps	  to	  distinctively	  motivate	  it.	  	  	  	  
The	  first	  thing	  to	  notice	  is	  that	  there	  are	  other	  plausible	  ethical	  principles	  that	  require	  us	  
to	   act	   even	   when	   our	   doing	   so	   will	   not	   make	   a	   difference.	   For	   example,	   the	   duty	   of	   fair	   play	  
requires	   that	   one	   not	   benefit	   from	   successful	   cooperative	   institutions	   without	   making	   a	   fair	  
contribution	  to	  them;	   i.e.,	   that	  one	  not	   freeride	   (see	  e.g.	  Klosko	  2004).	  Consider,	  as	  an	  example,	  
sneaking	  onto	  a	  public	  bus	  without	  paying	  the	  fare.	  
Second,	   it	   may	   be	   useful	   to	   more	   precisely	   state	   the	   principle	   that	   I	   endorse	   (see	  
McPherson	  forthcoming-­‐b	  for	  more	  detailed	  discussion):	  	  
Anti-­‐Complicity	  	   It	   is	   typically	   wrong	   to	   aim	   to	   benefit	   by	   cooperating	   with	   the	   wrongful	  
elements	  of	  others’	  plans	  	  
When	   introducing	   a	   principle,	   it	   is	   often	   useful	   to	   briefly	   explain	   each	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   that	  
principle.	  I	  now	  do	  this	  for	  Anti-­‐Complicity.	  My	  talk	  of	  ‘plans’	  here	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  apply	  
only	  to	  patterns	  of	  explicit	  reasoning;	  rather	  it	  should	  include	  the	  pattern	  of	  goals	  that	  explain	  an	  
individual’s	  or	  institution’s	  behavior.	  If	  my	  unconscious	  desire	  to	  humiliate	  my	  rival	  explains	  all	  of	  
my	  behavior,	  humiliating	  my	  rival	  counts	  as	  my	  plan,	  even	  if	  I	  would	  never	  consciously	  admit	  this	  
is	  what	  I	  am	  up	  to.	  My	  talk	  of	  ‘benefit’	  should	  similarly	  be	  read	  in	  an	  expansive	  way:	  smoking	  does	  
more	  harm	  than	  good,	  but	   if	  one	  seeks	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  cigarette,	  one	  is	  aiming	  at	  benefit	   in	  
the	  sense	  I	  am	  interested	  in.	  We	  should	  understand	  ‘cooperating’	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  our	  plans	  
often	   call	   for	   others	   to	   act	   in	   certain	   ways.	   For	   example,	   if	   I	   make	   widgets	   for	   sale,	   my	   plan	  
includes	  others’	  buying	  those	  widgets.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  crucial	  that	  any	  particular	  person	  buys	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my	  widgets.	  So	  anyone	  who	  buys	  a	  widget	  counts	  as	  cooperating	  with	  my	  plan.	  Finally	  plans	  can	  
be	  disjunctive:	  someone	  can	  plan	  to	  read	  the	  newspaper,	  buy	  some	  tools	  at	  the	  store,	  and	  then	  use	  
the	   tools	   to	   torture	   a	  puppy.	  The	   clearly	  wrongful	  part	  here	   is	   the	  puppy	   torturing.	  Buying	   the	  
tools	   is	   instrumental	   to	   the	   wrongful	   behavior,	   and	   is	   arguably	   wrongful	   for	   that	   reason,	   and	  
reading	   the	   newspaper	   is	   not	   a	   wrongful	   part	   of	   the	   plan.	   It	   is	  most	   clear	   that	   we	   should	   not	  
cooperate	  with	  the	  wrongful	  part	  of	  the	  plan.	  
	   Anti-­‐Complicity	   is	  plausible	   in	  part	  because	   it	   can	  explain	   the	  wrongness	  of	   certain	  acts	  
that	   cannot	   be	   explained	  by	   either	   the	   group	  or	   individual	   efficacy	   explanations.	  Return	   to	   the	  
example	   in	   the	  model	   essay:	   the	   restaurant	   that	   kidnaps	   and	   enslaves	   chefs	   to	   make	   its	   food.	  
Suppose	  the	  restaurant	  is	  demand-­‐insensitive:	   it’s	  partly	  a	  money-­‐laundering	  operation,	  and	  so	  it	  
will	  remain	  in	  business	  even	  if	  no	  one	  ever	  patronizes	   it.	  This	  means	  that	  neither	  an	  individual,	  
nor	   the	   whole	   group	   of	   patrons,	   have	   any	   chance	   of	   reducing	   the	   amount	   of	   slavery	   in	   the	  
restaurant	  by	  refusing	  to	  patronize	  it.	  Still,	  it	  seems	  wrong	  to	  go	  to	  the	  restaurant	  and	  enjoy	  the	  
fruits	  of	  the	  slave	  chefs’	  unwilling	  labors.	  Anti-­‐Complicity	  can	  explain	  why,	  while	  principles	  that	  
demand	  that	  the	  individual	  or	  group	  make	  a	  difference	  cannot.	  	  	  	  	  
	   If	  the	  arguments	  earlier	  in	  the	  paper	  are	  correct,	  the	  meat	  industry	  has	  a	  wrongful	  plan:	  to	  
produce	  meat	  in	  a	  way	  that	  involves	  egregious	  amounts	  of	  pain	  and	  early	  death,	  and	  then	  to	  sell	  
that	  meat.	  They	  do	  not,	  of	  course,	   typically	   sell	   it	  directly	   to	  consumers.	  But	  consumers	  buying	  
meat	   is	  clearly	  part	  of	   their	  plan:	   for	   if	   consumers	  do	  not	  buy,	   then	  wholesalers	  will	  not	  either,	  
and	  the	  meat	  industry’s	  plan	  would	  not	  be	  economically	  viable.	  (This	  is	  why	  meat-­‐industry	  groups	  
sometimes	  advertise	  directly	  to	  consumers:	  to	  increase	  consumer-­‐level	  demand	  for	  their	  goods.)	  
So,	   in	   buying	  meat,	   one	   is	   cooperating	  with	   their	  wrongful	   plan.	  And	  Anti-­‐Complicity	   suggests	  
that	  doing	  so	  is	  typically	  wrong.	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   Of	   the	   three	  explanations	   that	   I	  have	  discussed	  here	   (individual	   efficacy,	   group	  efficacy,	  
and	  Anti-­‐Complicity),	  I	  prefer	  the	  last.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  that,	  as	  with	  explanation	  
of	   the	   wrongness	   of	   killing,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   these	   explanations	   compete.	   Rather,	   if	   each	   is	  
sound,	  they	  could	  be	  complementary	  explanations	  of	  the	  wrongness	  of	  eating	  meat.	  This	  means	  
that	   the	   objector	   has	   her	   work	   cut	   out	   for	   her.	   For	   each	   of	   the	   three	   explanations	   that	   I	   have	  
discussed,	  she	  must	  either	  debunk	  the	  relevant	  explanatory	  principle,	  or	  argue	  that	  the	  principle	  
does	  not	  entail	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  individual	  efficacy	  
is	   required	   for	  wrongdoing	   in	   these	   cases,	   and	   then	   argue	   against	   the	   Singer-­‐style	   reasoning.	   I	  
take	   this	   to	   be	   the	   most	   promising	   way	   to	   reject	   the	   argument,	   but	   to	   nonetheless	   be	   a	   very	  
difficult	  task.	  	  
	  
The	  implications	  of	  the	  argument:	  veganism	  
In	  the	  previous	  three	  sections,	  I	  have	  considered	  several	  objections	  to	  each	  of	  the	  three	  premises	  
of	   the	  model	   argument,	   and	   refined	   that	   argument	   in	   light	   of	   those	   objections.	   I	   now	  want	   to	  
consider	   the	   broader	   implications	   of	   the	   argument,	   as	   refined.	   I	   will	   begin	   by	   considering	   two	  
objections	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  target	  gaps	  between	  the	  premises	  and	  my	  overall	  thesis:	  ethical	  
veganism.	  	  
	   An	   obvious	   but	   important	   objection	   at	   this	   stage	   notes	   that	  my	   aim	   in	   this	   paper	   is	   to	  
argue	   for	   ethical	   veganism:	   the	   view	   that	   it	   is	   (at	   least	   typically)	  wrong	   to	   eat	   or	   otherwise	  use	  
animal	  products.	  However,	  the	  model	  argument	  concludes	  only	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  The	  
model	  argument	  itself	  thus	  fails	  to	  establish	  ethical	  veganism.	  I	  grant	  this	  objection.	  However,	  the	  
argument	  I	  have	  developed	  in	  this	  paper	  naturally	  extends	  to	  support	  ethical	  veganism.	  	  
	   The	  first	  point	  to	  notice	  is	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  farming	  with	  animals	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
does	  not	  involve	  shortening	  their	  lives	  or	  making	  them	  suffer.	  My	  argument	  does	  not	  suggest	  any	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objection	  to	  using	  animal	  products	  made	  on	  such	  farms.	  However,	  when	  we	  turn	  from	  possible	  to	  
actual	   animal	   farming,	   we	   find	   that	   my	   case	   against	   killing	   animals	   and	   making	   them	   suffer	  
applies	   to	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   institutions	   that	   produce	   animal	   products	   (with	   the	   exceptions	   of	  
some	  shellfish	  farms).	  The	  reasons	  lie	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  biology	  and	  economics.	  Consider	  
a	  single	  example:	  even	  the	  most	  humane	  dairy	  farm	  will	  typically	  produce	  as	  many	  male	  calves	  as	  
female,	  and	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  males	  will	  be	  killed	  early,	  so	  as	  not	  to	  be	  an	  economic	  burden.	  That	  
means	   that	   the	  central	  plan	  of	  almost	  any	  economically	  viable	  dairy	   farming	  operation	   involves	  
raising	  cows	  to	  be	  killed	  (or	  to	  be	  sold	  to	  another	  operation,	  knowing	  the	  latter	  operation	  will	  kill	  
them),	   a	   practice	   that	   I	   have	   argued	   above	   is	   typically	  wrong.	  And	   this	   in	   turn	  means	   that	   the	  
overall	  argument	  I	  have	  proposed	  applies	  here:	   the	  core	  plan	  of	  economically	  viable	  dairy	   farms	  
involves	   systematic	   wrongdoing,	   and	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   be	   complicit	   with	   such	  
wrongdoing.	  But	  one	  would	  be	  complicit	  with	  such	  wrongdoing	  if	  one	  were	  to	  buy	  and	  consume	  
the	  milk	   (e.g.)	   produced	  on	   such	   farms,	   and	  hence	  buying	   and	   consuming	   such	  milk	  would	  be	  
wrong.	   This	   example	   generalizes	   to	   the	   institutions	   that	   produce	   almost	   all	   of	   our	   animal	  
products:	  eggs,	  cheese,	  leather,	  etc.	  And	  for	  this	  reason	  I	  think	  that	  my	  argument	  supports	  ethical	  
veganism	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  requirement	  to	  be	  a	  vegetarian	  who	  merely	  refrains	  from	  eating	  meat.	  
	   A	   second	   worry	   about	   my	   overall	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   initial	   simple	   statement	   of	   the	  
argument	   in	   premise	   and	   conclusion	   form	   in	   the	   model	   essay	   is	   misleading.	   In	   the	   preceding	  
sections,	   I	   have	   emphasized	   various	   ways	   that	   this	   argument	   should	   be	   refined,	   but	   there	   is	   a	  
general	  worry	  that	  should	  be	  explored.	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  model	  argument	  emphasized	  that	  it	  
is	  only	   typically	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  And	  as	   I	  explained	   in	  my	   initial	  discussion	  of	  Premise	  One,	  
this	  qualifier	  should	  be	  read	  back	  into	  the	  premises.	  So	  the	  argument	  should	  look	  like	  this:	  	  
1. It	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer	  
2. If	  it	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  make	  animals	  suffer,	  then	  it	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals	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3. If	  it	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals,	  then	  it	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat	  
C. It	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat.	  	  
The	   first	   thing	   to	  do	   is	   to	   verify	   that	   this	   statement	  of	   the	   argument,	   like	   the	   statement	   in	   the	  
model	  essay,	   is	  valid.	  It	   is:	  the	  addition	  of	  the	  word	  “typically”	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  logical	  form	  of	  
the	  argument,	  which	  is:	  P,	  if	  P	  then	  Q,	  if	  Q	  then	  R,	  so	  R,	  which	  is	  a	  slightly	  more	  complex	  variant	  of	  
the	   classic	  modus	   ponens	  argument	   form.	  However,	   there	   are	   two	   connected	  worries	   about	   the	  
argument	   as	   given.	   First,	   the	   reference	   to	   typicality	   points	   us	   at	   a	   range	   of	   ordinary	   cases,	   but	  
every	  sort	  of	  exception	  that	  we	  have	  identified	  for	  each	  premise	  is	  an	  exception	  that	  must	  hold	  for	  
the	  argument	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  discussion	  has	  identified	  a	  raft	  of	  ‘atypical’	  exception	  cases:	  cases	  of	  
making	   animals	   suffer	   to	   avoid	   ethically	   awful	   alternatives,	   cases	   of	   eating	   oysters	   and	   other	  
animals	  incapable	  of	  experiencing	  pain,	  and	  cases	  of	  eating	  meat	  (like	  some	  roadkill)	  that	  was	  not	  
wrongfully	  produced.	  	  
	   These	  cases	  do	  not	  exhaust	  the	  set	  of	  potential	  exceptions	  that	  the	  argument	  permits.	  And	  
one	   might	   worry	   that	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   argument	   might	   be	   far	   too	   weak	   to	   support	   anything	  
resembling	   veganism.	   To	   begin	   to	   see	   the	   force	   of	   this	   worry,	   notice	   that	   I	   have	   granted	   that	  
human	   suffering	   and	   death	   may	   tend	   to	   be	   substantially	   more	   ethically	   significant	   than	   the	  
suffering	   and	   death	   of	   non-­‐human	   animals.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	   we	   saw	   above,	   killing	   you	   or	  
making	  you	  suffer	  would	  be	  wrong	  for	  multiple	  reasons:	  some	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  awfulness	  of	  
suffering,	  and	  the	  deprivation	  of	  your	  future,	  and	  others	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  ethical	  significance	  of	  
your	  autonomy.	  	  
	   In	  light	  of	  this,	  my	  argument	  at	  least	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  central	  and	  pressing	  human	  
interests	  should	  typically	  take	  priority	  over	  the	  welfare	  of	  non-­‐human	  animals.	  For	  example,	  my	  
conclusion	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  should	  typically	  harm	  or	  kill	  a	  non-­‐human	  animal	  
if	  doing	  so	  is	  needed	  to	  prevent	  suffering	  or	  death	  to	  a	  human	  being.	  This	  is	  practically	  relevant:	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in	  various	  times	  and	  places,	  animal	  products	  have	  been	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  the	  only	  feasible	  
nutritionally	  adequate	  human	  diets.	  For	  example,	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  owning	  a	  cow	  –	  or	  
even	  a	  handful	  of	  chickens	  –	  can	  offer	  crucial	  protection	  against	  certain	  forms	  of	  malnutrition.	  I	  
take	   it	   to	   be	   a	   virtue	   of	   my	   argument	   that	   it	   is	   compatible	   with	   cases	   like	   these	   counting	   as	  
legitimate	  exceptions	  to	  the	  vegan	  principle.	  	   At	  this	  point,	  however,	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  the	  case	  for	  veganism	  has	  any	  practical	  
bite	  at	  all.	  After	  all,	  becoming	  a	  vegan	  involves	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  sacrifice	  of	  real	  goods.	  	  Consider	  three	  
sorts	   of	   examples.	   First,	   there	   is	   a	   sea	   of	   delicious	   animal-­‐involving	   food,	   so	   as	   a	   vegan	   one	  
sacrifices	   access	   to	  a	   range	  of	   interesting	  aesthetic	  goods.	   Second,	   food	   is	  deeply	  meaningful	   to	  
many	  people,	   and	  animal	  products	   are	   centrally	   involved	   in	  many	   important	   cultural	   traditions	  
and	   occasions.	   To	   be	   a	   vegan	   is	   thus	   to	   complicate	   one’s	   relationship	   to	   those	   traditions	   and	  
meanings.	   Finally,	   because	   shared	   values	   are	   central	   to	   many	   personal	   and	   professional	  
relationships,	   veganism	   could	   be	   an	   impediment	   to	   such	   relationships,	   especially	   in	   cultural	  
contexts	  where	  veganism	  is	  seen	  as	  threatening.	  	  
	   If	   the	   fact	   that	   veganism	   required	   one	   to	   sacrifice	   goods	   like	   these	   typically	   rendered	  
omnivorism	   permissible,	   then	   veganism	   would	   not	   typically	   be	   ethically	   required,	   as	   I	   claim.	  
Instead,	  it	  would	  be	  an	  admirable	  but	  non-­‐obligatory	  ideal.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  sorts	  
of	  sacrifices	   just	  mentioned	  suffice	  to	  make	  omnivorism	  permissible.	  The	  core	  issue	  here	  is	  how	  
weighty	  the	  considerations	  in	  favor	  of	  veganism	  that	  I	  have	  developed	  in	  this	  paper	  are.	  The	  issue	  
is	  complex,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  a	  reasonable	  heuristic	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  initial	  example	  in	  the	  
model	   paper:	   some	   circumstances	   would	   warrant	   torturing	   the	   stray	   puppy	   imagined	   in	   that	  
example.	  But	  those	  circumstances	  would	  be	  comparatively	  dire.	  I	  contend	  that	  only	  similarly	  dire	  
circumstances	   would	   warrant	   ordering	   the	   sirloin	   steak	   for	   dinner.	   And	   the	   sacrifices	   typically	  
involved	  in	  becoming	  vegan,	  while	  significant,	  fall	  well	  below	  this	  threshold.	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   Challenging	  this	  heuristic	  would	  be	  yet	  another	  natural	  way	  to	  object	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  
this	   paper.	   However,	   I	   think	   the	   heuristic	   is	   basically	   sound.	   And	   if	   it	   is,	   the	   argument	   of	   the	  
paper	   suggests	   that	   we	   ought	   to	   eschew	   almost	   all	   animal	   products	   in	   almost	   all	   ordinary	  
circumstances.	  We	  ought,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  be	  vegan.	  	  
	  
Pedagogical	  coda	  
I	  conclude	  this	  paper	  by	  returning	  to	  my	  pedagogical	  aims:	  to	  aid	  you	  in	  thinking	  about	  how	  to	  
make	  (and	  critically	  examine)	  philosophical	  arguments	  in	  ethics.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  I	  will	  review	  
the	  basic	  elements	  of	  philosophical	  argument	  that	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  and	  illustrate	  in	  this	  
paper.	  	  
	   The	  argument	  of	  the	  model	  essay	  began	  with	  a	  vivid	  example:	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  would	  be	  
wrong	  to	  torture	  a	  puppy	  in	  a	  specific	  scenario.	  This	  case	  supported	  a	  general	  principle:	  that	  it	  is	  
wrong	  to	  make	  animals	   suffer.	  The	  case	  supported	   the	  principle	   in	  part	  because	   the	  case	  seems	  
representative	  of	  the	  principle.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  there	  is	  some	  unique	  feature	  of	  puppies	  that	  
explains	  why	   it	   is	  wrong	   to	   torture	   them,	   for	   example.	  This	  principle	  was	   also	   supported	  by	   an	  
underlying	  ethical	  explanation:	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  cause	  animals	  to	  suffer,	  because	  of	  how	  awful	  it	  is	  to	  
experience	   suffering.	   Although	   general	   principles	   themselves	   appear	   explanatorily	   illuminating,	  
explanations	  and	  general	  principles	  can	  be	  different.	  One	  way	  to	  see	   this	   is	   to	  notice	   that	   there	  
can	   be	   multiple	   good	   explanations	   of	   a	   single	   ethical	   principle,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   future-­‐
deprivation	   and	   autonomy-­‐violation	   explanations	   of	   the	   wrongness	   of	   killing.	   In	   making	  
arguments,	   cases,	   general	   principles,	   and	   explanations	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   most	   important	  
elements	  to	  develop.	  These	  elements	  should	  fit	  together	  in	  a	  rationally	  compelling	  way,	  and	  one	  
good	  way	  to	  do	  that	  is	  to	  put	  these	  elements	  together	  into	  a	  valid	  argument,	  as	  I	  again	  did	  in	  the	  
model	  essay.	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   In	   critically	   examining	   an	   argument,	   you	  might	   in	   principle	   target	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
argument	  itself:	   for	  example,	  showing	  that	  the	  argument	  contains	  some	  fallacious	  reasoning.	  Or	  
you	  might	  challenge	  the	  ethical	  claims	  the	  argument	  makes	  about	  specific	  cases:	  for	  example,	  you	  
could	   try	   to	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	  wrong	  with	   torturing	   puppies.	   (But	   I	   dearly	   hope	   you	  
don’t	  do	  that!)	   It	   is	   far	  more	  common	  for	   it	   to	  be	  useful	  to	  challenge	  the	  general	  principles	  and	  
explanations	  offered	  in	  an	  argument.	  I	  have	  discussed	  several	  important	  ways	  of	  executing	  these	  
challenges.	  First,	   it	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  look	  to	  extreme	  case,	  to	  see	  if	  principles	  are	  really	  generally	  
applicable.	  For	  example,	  the	  model	  argument	  appeals	  to	  suffering	  to	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  
meat.	  But	  some	  animals	   (such	  as	  oysters)	  cannot	  suffer.	  So	   the	  model	  argument	  cannot	  explain	  
why	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  eat	  them.	  Second,	  it	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  see	  if	  an	  argument	  only	  works	  because	  it	  
obscures	   an	   ethically	   important	   distinction.	   I	   discussed	   this	   issue	   using	   the	   example	   of	   the	  
contrast	  between	  being	   in	  pain	  and	  suffering.	  Third,	   it	   is	  always	  a	  good	   idea	   to	  ask	   if	   there	   is	  a	  
superior	   competitor	   to	   the	   general	   principle	   or	   ethical	   explanation	   offered	   in	   an	   argument.	  
Examples	   of	   this	   strategy	   discussed	   above	   were	   the	   objection	   from	   contractualism,	   and	   the	  
objection	  that	  autonomy	  violation	  is	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  why	  killing	  is	  typically	  wrong.	  Fourth,	  
a	   very	   natural	   objection	   to	   an	   explanation	   or	   principle	   is	   that	   it	   is	   incomplete.	   For	   example,	   I	  
considered	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  only	  wrong	  to	  deprive	  a	  creature	  of	  its	  valuable	  future	  if	  that	  creature	  
is	  capable	  of	  caring	  about	  that	  future.	  And	  I	  discussed	  the	  idea	  that	  complicity	  with	  wrongdoing	  is	  
only	   morally	   objectionable	   if	   such	   complicity	   can	   make	   a	   difference	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  
underlying	  wrongdoing.	  Fifth,	  another	   important	   type	  of	  objection	   to	  some	  explanations	   is	   that	  
those	   explanations	   rest	   on	   false	   presuppositions.	   For	   example,	   I	   considered	   the	   possibility	   that	  
most	  animals	  do	  not	  have	  valuable	  futures	  in	  the	  ethically	  relevant	  sense,	  because	  most	  animals	  
lack	  rich	  enough	  psychological	  connections	  to	  remain	  the	  same	  moral	  patient	  from	  one	  day	  to	  the	  
next.	   Finally,	   another	   important	   way	   to	   challenge	   an	   argument	   is	   to	   show	   that	   there	   is	   a	   gap	  
McPherson	  	   	   	  How	  to	  argue	  for	  (and	  against)	  ethical	  veganism	   	  	   30	  
between	   an	   explanation	   offered	   in	   support	   of	   an	   ethical	   principle,	   and	   the	   principle	   itself.	   For	  
example,	  the	  case	  of	  eating	  blamelessly	  produced	  roadkill	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  between	  its	  
being	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals,	  and	  its	  being	  wrong	  to	  eat	  meat,	  because	  some	  meat	  does	  not	  come	  
from	  animals	  that	  were	  wrongfully	  killed.	  	  
	   I	  take	  these	  to	  be	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  tools	  for	  critically	  analyzing	  philosophical	  
arguments.	   However,	   there	   are	  many	  more	   to	   be	   discovered.	   One	   very	   good	   habit	   to	   get	   into	  
when	  reading	  philosophical	  papers	   is	   to	  ask:	  what	  kind	  of	  argument	   is	   this?	  How	   is	   this	  author	  
objecting	  to	  that	  argument?	  If	  you	  do	  that	  consistently,	  you	  will	  soon	  have	  a	  very	  rich	  repertoire	  
of	  tools	  for	  evaluating	  others’	  arguments,	  and	  making	  your	  own.	  One	  final	  note	  about	  how	  to	  use	  
these	  tools.	  Probably	  the	  most	  important	  place	  to	  use	  the	  tools	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  in	  
revising	  your	  own	  paper.	  Once	  you	  have	  a	  draft	  of	  your	  paper	  in	  hand,	  you	  should	  be	  merciless	  in	  
carefully	   reading	   through	   it,	   asking:	   how	   compelling	   is	   this	   argument?	   How	   could	   someone	  
reasonably	  object	  to	  it?	  Are	  their	  objections	  sound?	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  is	  most	  important	  to	  use	  these	  
tools	  to	  examine	  arguments	  for	  the	  conclusions	  that	  you	  most	  care	  about.	  Only	  by	  doing	  so	  can	  
you	   determine	  whether	   these	   conclusions	   are	   reasonable,	   or	   whether	   you	   are	   guilty	   of	   wishful	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  One	  final	  bit	  of	  guidance:	  you	  should	  always	  recognize	  help	  you	  have	  received	   in	  writing	  a	  paper!	   I	  am	  indebted	  to	  
many	  people	  for	  helpful	  comments	  and	  discussion	  of	  ideas	  related	  to	  this	  paper.	  These	  include	  Mark	  Budolfson,	  David	  
Plunkett,	   Tyler	   Doggett,	   Andrew	   Chignell,	   Sean	   Walsh,	   Derek	   Baker,	   Tom	   Dougherty,	   Gideon	   Rosen,	   and	   Katie	  
Batterman,	   to	   audiences	   at	   Rhodes	   College,	   Bowling	   Green	   State	   University,	   Charles	   Sturt	   University,	   and	   Virginia	  
Commonwealth	  University,	  and	  to	  many	  of	  my	  students	  for	  discussion.	  I	  am	  also	  indebted	  to	  Liz	  Harman,	  whose	  talk	  
about	  ethical	  vegetarianism	  first	  started	  me	  thinking	  systematically	  about	   it.	  Parts	  of	  this	  paper	  draw	  significantly	  on	  
my	  2014,	  and	  especially	  my	  forthcoming-­‐b.	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